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Jennifer Johovich 
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This issue summarizes most of the United States 
Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions of the last 
term. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
?~~~ Thermal Imaging 
~) The defendant in Kyllo v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2038 
~· ... :~;-~',(2001 ), was suspected by an agent of the Department of 
~;.cc~-4h~ Interior of growing marijuana in his home. Because 
growing marijuana typically requires lamps that emit heat, 
agents used an Amega Thermovision 210 thermal imager to 
scan his residence. The scanner detects infrared radiation, 
which is emitted by nearly all objects but remains invisible to 
the naked eye. The scan took only a few minutes and 
showed that the "roof over the garage and a side wall of 
[Kyllo's] home were relatively hot compared to the rest of 
the home and substantially warmer than neighboring 
homes." Based on the scan results, Agent Elliot concluded 
that Kyllo was growing marijuana plants using halide lights. 
Based in part on the thermal imaging scan, a warrant to 
search the residence was obtained. The search confirmed 
that Kyllo was in fact growing more than 1 00 marijuana 
plants in his home. 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue whether a ther-
mal imaging scan of a residence constitutes a "search" with-
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Applying the test 
from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court 
had held in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), that a 
"Fourth Amendment search does not occur- even when 
the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned -
unless 'the individual manifested a subjective expectation of 
p,rivacy in the object of the challenged search,' and 'society 
[is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable."' ld. 
at 2042-43. Recognizing the heightened expectation of pri-
vacy in a private home, the Court stated that "there is a 
ready criterion, with roots deep in common law, of the mini-
mal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowl-
edged to be reasonable. To withdraw protection of this min-
imum expectation would be to permit police tec.hnology to 
erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment." 
ld. at 2043. 
The government argued that thermal imaging detects 
only heat radiating from the external surfaces of the house 
and, therefore, was not a search. The dissent supported 
this contention, distinguishing between "off-the-wall" obser-
vations and "through-the-wall" surveillance. Rejecting this 
argument, the Court stated that "[w]hile the technology used 
in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt 
must take account of more sophisticated systems that are 
already in use or in development." ld. at 2044. 
The government further contended that because the 
agents drew only an inference regarding the activity in the 
home it was not a search. In addition, the government as-
serted that thermal imaging was constitutional because it 
did not "detect private activities occurring in private areas." 
ld. at 2045. The Court rejected these arguments as well. 
Quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), 
the Court held that '"[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be con-
strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable 
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner 
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests 
and rights of individual citizens.' Where, as here, the 
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, 
to explore details of the home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveil-
lance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable with-
out a warrant." Kyllo, 121 S.Ct. at 2046. 
Warrantless Arrest for Minor Offenses 
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S.Ct. 1536 (2001 ), 
Mrs. Atwater was arrested for a seat belt violation following 
a traffic stop. She sued the City of Lago Vista, claiming her 
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. The question 
before the Court was whether the Fourth Amendment pro-
hibits warrantless arrests for a minor criminal offense, such 
as a misdemeanor seat belt violation punishable only by a 
fine. 
Atwater claimed that police officers' authority to make 
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warrantless arrests for misdemeanors was restricted at 
common law. She argued specifically that "'founding-era 
common-law rules' forbade peace officers to make warrant-
less misdemeanor arrests except in cases of 'breach of the 
peace,' a category she claims was then understood narrow-
ly as covering only those nonfelony offenses 'involving or 
tending toward violence."' ld. at 1543. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. After examining the com-
mon usage of the term "breach of the peace," as well as the 
available case law, the Court discovered "divergent conclu-
sions with respect to officers' warrantless misdemeanor ar-
rest power." ld. at 1544. Apparently the term "breach of the 
peace" meant different things depending on the context. 
"Having reviewed the relevant English decisions, as well as 
English and colonial American legal treatises, legal dictio-
naries, and procedure manuals, we simply are not con-
vinced that Atwater's is the correct, or even necessarily the 
better, reading of the common-law history." ld. at 1546. "We 
simply cannot conclude that the Fourth Amendment, as · 
originally understood, forbade peace officers to arrest with-
out a warrant for misdemeanors not amounting to or involv-
ing breach of the peace." ld. at 1550. 
Alternatively, Atwater asked the Court to "mint a new rule 
of constitutional law on the understanding that when histori-
cal practice fails to speak conclusively to a claim grounded 
on the Fourth Amendment, courts are left to strike a current 
balance between individual and societal interests by sub-
jecting particular contemporary circumstances to traditional 
standards of reasonableness." ld. at 1553. 
The Court recognized that Atwater "might well prevail" if a 
rule was derived to "exclusively address the uncontested 
facts of this case." I d. at 1553. However, the Court replied 
to Atwater's argument by stating, "we have traditionally rec-
ognized that a responsible J=ourth Amendment balance is 
not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-
case determinations of government need, lest every discre-
tionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion 
for constitutional review." ld. at 1553. 
The Supreme Court concluded that Atwater's arrest was 
constitutional. Probable cause was not disputed, and, al-
though the arrest may have caused Atwater embarrassment 
or humiliation, it was not made in an extraordinary manner. 
Execution of Search Warrants 
In Illinois v. McArthur, 121 S.Ct. 946 (2001 ), the Supreme 
Court concluded that law enforcement officials acted rea-
sonably when they refused to allow a man suspected of un-
lawful possession of drug paraphernalia and marijuana to 
enter his residence unaccompanied until a search warrant 
was obtained. 
On April 2, 1997, Tera McArthur went to the trailer she 
shared with her husband to obtain her personal effects. 
Mrs. McArthur was accompanied by police officers for the 
purpose of keeping the peace. Upon leaving the trailer with 
her belongings, Mrs. McArthur advised the police to search 
the trailer because she had seen her husband slide "some 
dope underneath the couch." Charles McArthur refused to 
allow the police to search his trailer. At that time a police of-
ficer, accompanied by Tera McArthur, left the scene to ob-
tain a search warrant. When Charles McArthur, now posi-
tioned on the front porch, attempted to enter his trailer, the 
remaining officer detained him, explaining that McArthur 
would not be permitted to enter his residence unaccompa-
nied by a police officer until a search warrant was obtained. 
A search warrant was obtained approximately two hours 
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later, and a search of the trailer uncovered 2.5 grams of 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. 
The Supreme Court held that the temporary seizure was 
reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. "It 
involves a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law 
enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances."' ld. at 950. 
The Court, applying a balancing test, based its decision on 
four circumstances. First, the police had probable cause to 
believe the trailer contained contraband and had an oppor-
tunity to make an assessment of Tera McArthur's reliability. 
Second, the police had good reason to believe that if the 
defendant were permitted to enter the residence unaccom-
panied he would destroy the evidence. Third, the police 
chose to prevent McArthur from entering his residence until 
a warrant arrived instead of searching the trailer or arresting 
McArthur without a warrant. "They left his home and his be-
longings intact." ld. at 950. '"The chief evil against which 
the ... Fourth Amendment is directed' is warrantless entry 
and search of home." ld. at 950 (quoting United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)). Fourth, 
the restraint was imposed for a limited amount of time. 
McArthur was restrained for only two hours. "As far as the 
record reveals, this time period was nci longer than reason-
ably necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to obtain 
the warrant." 121 S.Ct. at 951. 
The Court stated: "[W]e have found no case in which this 
Court has held unlawful a temporary seizure that was sup-
ported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the 
loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a war-
rant in a reasonable period of time." ld. at 951-52. 
Pretextual Searches 
In Arkansas v. Sullivan, 121 S.Ct. 1876 (2001 ), Sullivan 
was stopped by police officers for speeding and having im-
properly tinted windows. After viewing Sullivan's driver's li-
cense, the police realized that they were aware of intelli-
gence on Sullivan regarding narcotics. Sullivan was arrest-
ed for speeding, driving without registration and insurance 
documentation, carrying a weapon (a rusty roofing hatchet), 
and improper window tinting. During an inventory search of 
Sullivan's car following his arrest, police officers found drugs 
(methamphetamine) and drug paraphernalia. Sullivan 
moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that his arrest 
was merely a "pretext and sham to search" him. The trial 
court granted Sullivan's motion to suppress, and the 
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. 
The U.S. Supreme Court relied on its previous decision 
in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 'The 
Arkansas Supreme Court declined to follow Whren on the 
ground that 'much of it is dicta.' The court reiterated the trial 
judge's conclusion that 'the arrest was pretextual and made 
for the purpose of searching Sullivan's vehicle for evidence 
of a crime,' and observed that 'we do not believe that Whren 
disallows' suppression on such a basis. Finally, the court 
asserted that, even if it were to conclude that Whren pre-
cludes inquiry into an arresting officer's subjective motiva-
tion, 'there is nothing that prevents this court from interpret-
ing the U.S. Constitution more broadly than the United 
States Supreme Court, which has the effect of providing 
more rights."' ld. at 1878 (citations omitted). 
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that the Arkansas 
Supreme Court's affirmation of the trial court's suppression 
of the drug-related evidence was improper because the de-
cision was "flatly contrary" to the U.S. Supreme Court's de-
cision in Whren. The Court, quoting from its decision in 
Whren, noted its '"unwillingness to entertain Fourth 
Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of 
individual officers,' and held unanimously that 'subjective in-
tentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis."' ld. at 1877. 
Next, the Court addressed the Arkansas Supreme 
Court's holding that it may interpret the U.S. Constitution to 
provide greater protection than the United States Supreme 
Court's federal constitutional precedents. The state court 
had cited Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). In Hass, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court held ''that while 'a State is 
free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions 
on police activity than those this Court holds to be neces-
sary upon federal constitutional standards,' it 'may not im-
pose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal consti-
tutional law when this Court specifically refrains from impos-
ing them."' Sullivan, 121 S.Ct. at 1878 (quoting Hass, 420 
U.S. at 719). 
Drug Roadblocks 
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000), 
the city of Indianapolis set up vehicle checkpoints in an ef-
fort to discover and interdict illegal drugs. The police 
stopped a predetermined number of vehicles at each check-
point. An officer approached the vehicle, advised the driver 
that they were being stopped at a drug checkpoint, and 
asked the driver for a license and vehicle registration. The 
officer looked for "signs of impairment" and condw;:ted an 
"open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside." I d. 
at 450-51. The average time of each vehicle stop was 2-3 
minutes, not including vehicles subject to further process-
ing. 
Respondents filed a class action suit against the city, 
claiming a Fourth Amendment violation. The Supreme 
Court agreed. 
Previous Supreme Court decisions had upheld brief, sus-
picionless vehiGie searches at -permanent immigration 
checkpoints to intercept illegal aliens and at highway sobri-
ety checkpoints to identify and detain drunk drivers. United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Michigan 
Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). The pri-
mary purposes of these checkpoint programs were "to 
serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing 
the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety." 
However, the Court had never indicated "approval of a 
checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect 
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." 121 S.Ct. at 452. 
The Court rejected the contention that the Indianapolis 
program had the same ultimate purpose as the previously 
upheld checkpoint programs: to arrest those suspected of 
committing a crime. The Court reasoned that "if we were to 
rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be 
little check on the ability of the authorities to construct road-
blocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement pur-
pose." ld. at 454. 
In addition, the city argued that the secondary purpose of 
the checkpoints -to verify license and registration informa-
tion and_keep_impaired_motorists_oJLtbero_ad_:::- satisfied 
Fourth Amendment concerns. Again, the Court rejected the 
argument, finding that under such a policy "law enforcement 
authorities would be able to establish checkpoints for virtu-
ally any purpose so long as they also included a license or 
sobriety check." The Court went on to hold: "When law en-
forcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control 
purposes at checkpoints such as here, however, stops can 
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only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspi-
cion." ld. at 457. 
The Court did allow for exceptions in extraordinary situa-
tions when the primary purpose of a vehicle checkpoint is 
general crime control such as roadblocks designed to 
"thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous 
criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route." 
While allowing for exceptions, the Court declined to approve 
vehicle checkpoint programs "whose primary purpose is ulti-
mately indistinguishable from general crime control." ld. at 
455. 
Drug Testing 
Motivated by an apparent increase in cocaine use by pa-
tients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of 
South Carolina [MUSC] instituted a policy to identify preg-
nant patients suspected of drug abuse and began conduct-
ing urine tests of hospital obstetric patients pursuant to that 
policy. Ten obstetric patients who were arrested after test-
ing positive for cocaine sued the City of Charleston, law en-
forcement officials who helped develop and enforce the poli-
cy, and representatives of MUSC alleging, inter alia, viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against noncon-
sensual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches. The 
Fourth Circuit affirmed without addressing the consent 
issue. The Court of Appeals found the searches to be rea-
sonable as a matter of law under the "special needs" doc-
trine as set forth in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 
(1989); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 
(1989); and Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646 (1995). 
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S.Ct. 1281 
(2001 ), the Supreme Court held that: (1) the urine tests 
conducted by the MUSC were "searches" within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) absent patients' con-
sent, thetesting.and subsequent reporting of positive test 
results to police constituted unreasonable searches. The 
Court found that "because the hospital seeks to justify its 
authority to conduct drug tests and to turn the results over 
to law enforcement agents without the knowledge or con-
sent of the patients, this case differs from the four previous 
cases in which we have considered whether comparable 
drug tests "fit within the closely guarded category of consti-
tutionally permissible suspicionless searches." ld. at 1288. 
In each of the previous drug-testing cases the Court had 
used a balancing test where it "weighed the intrusion on the 
individual's interest in privacy against the 'special needs' 
that supported the program." ld. at 1288. However, in these 
cases the purpose of the drug test and the potential use of 
the test results were understood by the parties. In addition, 
there were protections against the dissemination of the test 
results to third parties. This was not true in this case. 
The Court found the critical difference to "lie in the nature 
of the 'special need' asserted as justification for the warrant-
less searches." In the previous drug-testing cases the "spe-
cial need" was "divorced from the State's general interest in 
law enforcement." ld. at 1289. Jjer~. a rE)yl_E?_'JV ofJ!l_E) policy 
plainly revealed that the purpose actually served by the 
MUSC searches was indistinguishable from the general in-
terest in crime control. The policy incorporated the police's 
operational guidelines, detailing chain of custody proce-
dures, possible criminal charges, and the logistics of police 
notification and arrests. The policy did not, however, dis-
cuss different courses of medical treatment for either the 
mother who has tested positive for cocaine or her infant. 
This appeared inconsistent with the stated purpose of the 
policy: to protect the health of both mother and child. 
The Supreme Court also stated that "[w]hile the ultimate 
goal of the program may well have been to get the women 
in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, 
the immediate objective of the searches was to generate 
evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach 
that goal." ld. at 1291. The Court found the "primary pur-
pose" of the policy to be to force women into drug treatment 
through the use of threat of arrest and prosecution. Given 
the primary purpose of the policy and the extensive involve-
ment of law enforcement officials in its development and im-
plementation, the policy violated the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspi-
cionless searches. 
CONFESSIONS: RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
In Texas v. Cobb, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001), Lindsey Owings 
found his home burglarized with his wife and infant daughter 
missing. Raymond Levi Cobb admitted to burglarizing the 
home, which was located across the street from his resi-
dence. Cobb was subsequently indicted for burglary and 
appointed counsel. While admitting to the burglary, Cobb 
denied knowledge of the whereabouts of Mrs. Owings and 
her daughter. 
Cobb's father, whom Cobb was living with while free on 
bond, contacted police and indicated that Cobb confessed 
to killing Mrs. Owings and her daughter. Officers arrested 
Cobb and obtained his waiver of Fifth Amendment rights 
under Miranda. Cobb then confessed to police the murder 
of Mrs. Owings and her daughter and led police to the area 
where he buried their bodies. Cobb's confession was used 
to obtain his conviction of capital murder. 
Cobb appealed the conviction to the Court of Criminal 
Appeals of Texas, claiming his confession should have been 
suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. He contended his right to 
counsel attached when he was appointed counsel for the 
burglary charge and, therefore, police were required to ob-
tain permission to interrogate Cobb from his appointed 
counsel. The state court agreed, but the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided to review the case to determine whether the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to crimes that 
are "factually related" to those that have actually been 
charged. 
In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), the Court 
held that "[t]he Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] ... is of-
fense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future pros-
ecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is com-
menced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial 
criminal proceedings - whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraign-
ment." ld. at 175. Thus, a defendant's statements regarding 
offenses for which he had not been charged were admissi-
ble notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel on other charged offenses. 
Some state and federal courts had read an exception into 
McNeil's offense-specific definition for crimes that are factu-
ally related to a charged offense. The Court rejected this in-
terpretation of McNeil, reiterating its holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific. The Court 
further stated: 
Although it is clear that the Sixth Amendment right to 
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counsel attaches only to charged offenses, we have 
recognized in other contexts that the definition of an 
"offense" is not necessarily limited to the four corners 
of a charging instrument. In Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299 ... we explained that "where the ( 
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, 
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact 
which the other does not." ... We have since applied 
the B/ockburger test to delineate the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, which pre-
vents multiple or successive prosecutions for the 
"same offence." We see no constitutional difference 
between the meaning of the term "offense" in the con-
texts of double jeopardy and of the right to counsel. 
Accordingly, we hold that when the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses 
that, even if.not formally charged, would be considered 
the same offense under the 8/ockburger test. ld. at 
. 1343. 
The Court concluded that Cobb's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel was not violated when he was interrogated about 
the disappearance of Mrs. Owing and her daughter. 
Therefore, the confession was admissible. 
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
In Ohio v. Matthew Reiner, 121 S.Ct. 1252 (2001), the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed an Ohio Supreme Court deci-
sion, holding that a witness who claims innocence may as-
sert the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. Matthew Reiner was convicted of the involun- (' 
tary manslaughter of his two-month old son, Alex. Alex died . 
from "shaken baby syndrome." Reiner contended that the 
family's baby-sitter, Susan Batt, was responsible for the in-
fant's death. Batt had cared for Reiner's children for about 
two weeks before the infant died and was alone with Alex 
during the potential time frame Alex sustained the fatal trau-
ma. 
Batt informed the trial court that she intended to assert 
her Fifth Amendment privilege when testifying at trial. The 
court granted Batt transactional immunity from prosecution 
at the State's request. Batt testified that she had refused to 
testify without immunity from prosecution "although she had 
·· done nothing wrong." ld. at 1253. Reiner was subsequently 
convicted of the involuntary manslaughter of his infant son. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction on 
the ground that Batt had no valid Fifth Amendment privilege 
and that the trial court's grant of immunity was therefore un-
lawful. The state court held Batt did not have a valid Fifth 
Amendment privilege because her testimony at trial did not 
incriminate her. · 
The U.S. Supreme Court found that Batt did have a valid 
Fifth Amendment privilege. The Court stated "that one of 
the Fifth Amendment's 'basic functions ... is to protect inno-
cent men ... 'who otherwise might be ensnared by ambigu-
ous circumstances."' ld.at 1254 (quoting Grunewald v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 391). Batt had been alone with the 
infant for extended periods of time in the weeks preceding (. 
the infant's death. In addition, she was alone with the infant 
during the time period in which the fatal trauma may have 
occurred. The Court concluded that "Batt had 'reasonable 
cause' to apprehend danger from her answers if questioned 
at respondent's trial" and, therefore, reasonably feared that 
her answers to direct questions may have incriminated her. 
ld. at1255. 
EX POST FACTO: OVERTURNING JUDICIAL 
PRECEDENT 
In Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. 1693 (2001 ), the ac-
cused stabbed his victim, who remained comatosed until his 
death 15 months later. Rogers was convicted of second-
degree murder and subsequently appealed. He argued his 
conviction was precluded by the common law "year and a 
day" rule, which provided that a defendant cannot be con-
victed unless the victim dies within a year and a day of the 
defendant's act. The Tennessee Supreme Court abolished 
the rule, citing a lack of support in policy as the reason. It 
concluded, relying on Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 
(1964), that Rogers' due process rights were not violated. 
Rogers appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Rogers argued that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibited 
the application of the decision abolishing the common law 
"year and a day" rule, therefore violating his due process 
rights. The Court concluded: 
In the context of common law doctrines (such as the 
year and a day rule), there often arises a need to clari-
fy or even to reevaluate prior opinions as new circum-
stances and fact patterns present themselves. Such 
judicial acts, whether they be characterized as "mak-
ing" or "finding" the law, are a necessary part of the ju-
dicial business in States in which the criminal law re-
tains some of its common law elements. Strict appli-
cation of ex post facto principles in that context would 
unduly impair the incremental and reasoned develop-
ment of precedent that is the foundation of the com-
mon law system. The common law, in short, presup-
poses a measure of evolution that is incompatible with 
stringent application of ex post facto principles. It was 
on account of concerns such as these that Bouie re-
stricted due process limitations on the retroactive ap-
plication of judicial interpretations of criminal statutes 
to those that are "unexpected and indefensible by ref-
erence to the law which had been expressed prior to 
the conduct in issue." Rogers, 121 S.Ct. at 1700 (quot-
ing Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354). 
Applying this analysis to the facts, the Court concluded 
that the abolition of the "year and a day" rule was not unex-
pected and indefensible. The rule has been "abolished in 
the vast majority of jurisdictions recently to have addressed 
the issue." ld. at 1701. 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the Tennessee criminal 
homicide statute does not mention the "year and a day" 
rule. The statute defines criminal homicide simply as "the 
unlawful killing of another person which may be first degree 
murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide." Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 39-13-201 (1997). "[T]he rule had never once 
served as a ground of decision in any prosecution for mur-
der in the State. Indeed, in all the reported Tennessee 
cases, the rule has been mentioned only three·times, and 
each time in dicta." ld. at 1701. 
Finally, the Court concluded that "[t]here is, in short, noth-
ing to indicate that the Tennessee court's abolition of the 
rule in petitioner's case represented an exercise of the sort 
of unfair and arbitrary judicial action against which the Due 
Process Clause aims to protect." ld. at 1703. 
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MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE: MARIJUANA 
In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' 
Cooperative, 121 S.Ct. 1711 (2001 ), the Supreme Court re-
fused to recognize medical necessity as a legally cogniz-
able defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances 
Act. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative distributed 
marijuana for medical purposes under California's 1996 
Compassionate Use Act. 
The United States sued the Cooperative to enjoin it from 
distributing and manufacturing marijuana by arguing that, al-
though it may not have violated California law, it had violat-
ed federal law. Because an injunction issued by the District 
Court was openly violated, the Cooperative was subse-
quently found in contempt. 
The Controlled Substances Act prohibits "any person 
knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, 
or dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841 
(a)(1 ). The Act provides an exception in cases of govern-
ment-approved research projects. The Supreme Court con-
cluded that Congress would have provided for a medical 
necessity exception if it had intended to exempt such con-
duct. The Court failed to accept the Cooperative's argu-
ment that the Act contains implied exceptions, including 
medical necessity. 
Faced with the question whether federal courts ever have 
authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by 
statute, the Court stated "[w]hether as a policy matter, an 
exemption should be created is a question for legislative 
judgment, not judicial inference." I d. at 1717. The Court 
concluded, "we need only recognize that a medical necessi-
ty exception for marijuana is at odds with the terms of the 
Controlled Substances Act." ld. at 171.8. 
DEATH PENALTY 
Mitigating Circumstances 
The Supreme Court overturned a death sentence in 
Penry v. Johnson, 121 S.Ct. 1910 (2001 ). Although Penry 
was mentally retarded, the Court did not address the issue 
of whether a mentally retarded person should be executed, 
but rather overturned Penry's death sentence because the 
jury instructions did not allow jurors to sufficiently take his 
retardation into account. The Court stated it would revisit 
the issue of whether the execution of a mentally retarded 
person is constitutionally permissible in· its next term. 
In Penry I, the Supreme Court had held that, based on 
the prosecutor's argument and the jury instructions, "a rea-
sonable juror could well have believed that there was no ve-
hicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to 
be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence." 
ld. at 1915-16. The Court stated that a juror must be able to 
consider mitigating evidence when imposing sentence "so 
that 'the sentence imposed ... reflects a reasoned moral 
response to the defendant's background, character, and 
crime."' ld. at 1916. 
Penry was retried and again found guilty of capital mur-
der. In Penry II the jury was instructed to answer three spe-
cial issues to determine the sentence in addition to a sup-
plemental instruction. However, the verdict form only con-
tained the three special issues and not the supplemental in-
struction. These were the same three issues as in Penry I. 
The jury unanimously answered "yes" to each of the special 
issues, and the trial court sentenced Penry to death in ac-
cordance with state law. 
On review, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
jury instructions at Penry's resentencing complied with 
Penry I and whether the admission into evidence of state-
ments from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled 
interview with Penry ran afoul of the Fifth Amendment. 
Addressing the issue of the psychiatric report, the Court 
distinguished the instant case and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 
454 (1981 ). The Court stated that its holding in Estelle was 
"limited to the 'distinct circumstances' presented there" and 
"indicated that the Fifth Amendment analysis might be differ-
ent where a defendant 'intends to introduce psychiatric evi-
dence at the penalty phase."' ld. at 1919. Because Penry's 
facts were different from Estelle's, the Court found the 
Texas court's decision denying Penry's Fifth Amendment 
claim reasonable. 
Penry also claimed the jury instructions given at the sec-
ond sentencing hearing did not comply with the Supreme 
Court's holding in Penry I. "[T]he key under Penry I is that 
the jury be able to 'consider and give effect to [a defendant's 
mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence' .... For it is only 
when the jury is given a 'vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned 
moral response' to that evidence in rendering its sentencing 
decision,' that we can be sure that the jury 'has treated the 
defendant as a 'uniquely individual human being' and has 
made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate 
sentence."' Penry, 121 S.Ct. at 1920 (quoting Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)). 
The Court concluded that the three special issues con-
flicted with the supplemental instruction. "[l]t would have 
been both logically and ethically impossible for a juror to fol-
low both sets of instructions." ld. at 1922. Essentially, in 
order to avoid imposing a death sentence, the jury would 
have had to answer falsely to a special issue. The 
Supreme Court found the Texas court's determination that 
the jury instructions given in Penry II complied with Penry I 
unreasonable. 
Jury Instructions 
The accused in Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1263 
(2001 ), was convicted of murder, attempted armed robbery, 
and criminal conspiracy. Shafer was subsequently sen-
tenced to death. At the sentencing hearing, against defense 
argument, "[t]he trial judge decided 'not ... to charge the jury 
about parole ineligibility,' ... and informed counsel that he 
would instruct [the jury as follows]: 'Your consideration is 
restricted to what sentence to recommend. I will, as trial 
judge, impose the sentence you recommend. Section 16-3-
20 of the South Carolina Code of Laws provides that for the 
purpose of this section life imprisonment means until the 
death of the offender. Parole eligibility is not for your con-
sideration."' Shafer, 121 S.Ct. at 1269. Shafer appealed 
the death sentence, arguing that jurors should have been 
instructed that he was ineligible for parole. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 
512 U.S. 154 (1994). It "acknowledged that 'when the State 
places the defendant's-future dangerousness at issue and 
the only available alternative sentence to the death penalty 
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is life imprisonment without parole, due process entitles the 
defendant to inform the jury he is parole ineligible."' ld. at 
1270. It held "Simmons generally inapplicable to South 
Carolina's 'new sentencing scheme"' without considering if 
Shafer's future dangerousness was placed at issue. ld. at 
1270. 
Under the South Carolina sentencing scheme, however, 
the jury is the sole sentencer only upon an initial finding of a 
statutory aggravator. If aggravating circumstances are 
found, only two sentencing options are available to the jury, 
death and life without parole. The U.S. Supreme Court 
wrote:_''WetberE!fore hold that whenever future dangerous-
ness is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding under 
South Carolina's new scheme, due process requires that 
the jury be informed that a life sentence carries no possibili-
ty of parole." 
SEXUAL PREDATOR STATUTES 
Young, respondent in this case, was a convicted rapist 
(convicted of six rapes in three decades) confined in 
Washington state since 1 990 under that state's sexually vio-
lent predator statute. Seling v. Young, 121 S.Ct. 727 (2001 ). 
The statute provides for civil commitment of "sexually vio-
lent predators," persons who suffer from a mental abnormal-
ity ot personality disorder that makes them likely to engage 
in predatory acts of sexual violence. Wash. Rev. Code § 
71.09.010 et seq. (1992). 
Young filed a habeas corpus petition appealing his com-
mitment, arguing that the Act violated the Double Jeopardy, 
Ex Post Facto, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses. 
The Washington Supreme Court concluded that "the Act ... 
is concerned with treating committed persons for a current 
mental abnormality, and protecting society from the sexually 
violent acts associated with that abnormality, rather than 
beinQ concerned with criminal culpability." 
The U.S. Supreme Court began by assuming the Act was 
civil in nature. In Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 
(1 997), the Court "expressly disapproved of evaluating the 
civil nature of an Act by reference to the effect that Act has 
on a single individual. Instead, courts must evaluate the 
question by reference to a variety of factors 'considered in 
relation to the statute on its face'; the clearest proof is re-
quired to override legislative intent and conclude that an Act 
denominated civil is punitive in purpose or effect." I d. at 734. 
"With this in mind, [the Court] turn[ed] to the Court of 
Appeals' determination that respondent could raise an 'as-
applied' challenge to the Act on double jeopardy and ex · 
post facto grounds and seek release from confinement." ld. 
at 734. 
The Court held that "respondent cannot obtain release 
through an 'as-applied' challenge to the Washington Act on 
double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds." It agreed "with 
petitioner that an 'as-applied' analysis would prove unwork-
able. Such an analysis would never conclusively resolve 
whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby 
prevent a final determination of the scheme's validity under 
the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses." ld. at 
735. 
